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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
I. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND TITLE VII: APPROPRIATE
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS FOR DIFFERENT CLAIMS
A. Fetal Vulnerability Plan: Disparate Treatment Absent
Intent
In recent years there has been a proliferation of medical,1
legal,2 and other3 literature about the harmful effects of chemi-
cal exposure on the unborn human fetus and on the general re-
productive capacity of potential parents, male and female.4 Em-
ployers who seek to protect fertile women or their fetuses from
1. For a list of medical articles on the harmful effects of chemical exposure, see
Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the
1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IowA L.
REv. 63, 119-29 (1980).
2. Comment, Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CA.LM L.
REv. 1113 (1977); Finneran, Title VII and Restrictions on Employment of Fertile
Women, 31 LAB. L.J. 223 (1980); Furnish, supra note 1; Note, Birth Defects Caused by
Prenatal Exposure to Work Place Hazards: The Interface of Title VII with OSHA and
Tort Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. RF. 237 (1979); Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the
Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals
under Title VII, 69 GEo. L.J. 641 (1981).
3. Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace, CHEMIcAL & ENGINEERNG NEws, Feb.
11, 1980, at 28; The Genetic Barrier-Job Benefit or Job Bias (pts. 1-4), N.Y. Times,
Feb. 3-6, 1980, at 1, col. 1, Al, col 5, Al, col. 1, Al, col. 1; Bitter Reaction-Issue of
Fetal Damage Stirs Women Workers at Chemical Plants, Wall Street J., Feb. 9, 1979, at
1, col. 1; Chemical Concern-Worries are Growing Over Male Infertility Because of Job
Hazards, Wall Street J., Jan. 26, 1978 at 1, col. 6; Early Warning-Protection for Un-
born: Work Safety Issue Isn't as Simple as It Sounds, Wall Street J., Aug. 2, 1977, at 1,
col. 1.
4. Although either parent's exposure to chemicals can be harmful to the unborn
child, the focus has been on women. The effect of direct exposure on an unknown fetus
in utero accounts in part for the concern with the effects of chemical exposure on
women. Lead, for example, is known to pass through the placental membrane. 43 Fed.
Reg. 54,421 (1978)(medical findings accompanying OSHA lead standards codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1025). In fact, "[n]umerous parties to the [federal rule-making] hearings
raised the issue whether the fetus is. the most sensitive organism requiring protection
from exposure to lead." 43 Fed. Reg. 54,421. One such party was physician Kenneth
Bridbord of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, a congressionally
created research organization. See 29 U.S.C. § 671(b)(1976). "Bridbord ... argued that
the immaturity of the blood brain barrier in the newborn raises additional concern about
the presence of lead in fetal tissues." 43 Fed. Reg. 54,421-22.
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chemical exposure in the work environment5 may unintention-
ally violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 In Wright
v. Olin Corporation,' a case of first impression,8 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit suggested an appropriate concep-
tual framework and a corresponding defense for this type of Ti-
tle VII case. In addition, the court clarified the jurisdictional re-
quirements of an enforcement action brought by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Olin, a Virginia corporation, produces paper and other
packaging materials at its Pisgah Forest plant in Transylvania
County, North Carolina. The plant employs approximately 2600
peoples in 265 job classifications.10 Theresa Williams Wright was
a step-two operator in the finishing department of the plant.11
William Virgil Howell, a black, was a step-seven perforator oper-
ator.12 Wright and Williams filed individual charges of sex and
race discrimination with the EEOC's district office in Charlotte
during 1976 and 1977, respectively.
13
The EEOC began its action on September 25, 1978,14 based
on more than fifty charges of discrimination filed against Olin.1
5. This effort by employers may stem from an attempt to comply with the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976), and standards promulgated
under the Act.
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1971).
7. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
8. Id. at 1187 n.24.
9. Wright v. Olin Corp., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1615, 1617 (W.D.N.C.
1980)(lower court opinion in Wright/Howell class action).
10. 697 F.2d at 1182.
11. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1618.
12. Id. at 1619.
13. Id. at 1617-18. Both amended their charges early in 1979 and received right to
sue letters in May of that year. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1618. The Wright/
Howell class action was finally authorized on May 16, 1980, over a year after the action
was filed. Id. at 1617. The "right to sue" letter is a statutory prerequisite to any private
suit brought under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976)(by implication). "Right to
sue" letters are issued by the EEOC. The complaining party first files a charge with the
Commission, and the Commission then makes its own investigation and "reasonable
cause" determination. Id. at § 2000a-5(b). "Right to sue" letters are issued when the
EEOC has completed its investigation and decides not to file an enforcement action, or
upon request of the complaining party after 180 days have passed since the initial
charge. Id. at § 2000e-5(f)(1); see, e.g., Stebbins v. Continental Ins. Co., 442 F.2d 843
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
14. EEOC v. Olin Corporation, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1646, 1650
(W.D.N.C. 1980)(lower court opinion in EEOC enforcement action).
15, 697 F.2d at 1176.
2
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These discrimination charges, based on both race and sex, cov-
ered hiring, job classification, seniority, harassment, and dis-
charges. 16 The EEOC also questioned the validity of Olin's fetal
vulnerability plan under Title VII.17
After the EEOC action and the Wright/Howell class action
were consolidated for trial, the case was bifurcated to allow sep-
arate consideration of damages and liability."' Chief Judge
Woodrow Wilson Jones of the Western District of North Caro-
lina, sitting without a jury,19 overcame the jurisdictional objec-
tions of the defendants20 and ruled in their favor on the merits.
21
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's
judgment for the employer on the fetal vulnerability issue and
remanded the case for further proceedings.22 In addition, the
court set forth the conceptual framework and analysis applicable
on remand.
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based upon
sex or race in both the public and private sector.23 The EEOC
has responsibility for this part of the Act,24 and may bring civil
actions against employers to enforce its provisions.25 In addition,
individual victims may bring actions for themselves or on behalf
of a properly certified class. 26 The scope of an EEOC action is
limited by the scope of the charges filed with the EEOC and by
the scope of any reasonable investigation of those initial
charges. 27 EEOC action is further limited by requirements that a
reasonable cause determination be made and that employer-em-
ployee conciliation be attempted.2 The level of investigation
16. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1651.
17. Id. at 1658-59.
18. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1616.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1620 (first conclusion of law), 1650-51.
21. 697 F.2d at 1176.
22. Id. at 1187, 1192.
23. For statutory language, see infra notes 106 and 107.
24. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1981).
25. Id. at § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(1981).
26. These actions must satisfy the presuit review requirements of the EEOC, see
supra note 13, and the class action requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23. For a general discussion of these requirements, see
PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN A NUTSHELL 228-44 (2d ed.
1981).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)(1981).
28. 697 F.2d at 1176. See also EEOC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 366 (4th Cir.
19851
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and negotiation necessary to satisfy these two requirements at
the trial level is not always clear, and it may be even more diffi-
cult for an appellate court evaluating jurisdiction to determine
whether the requirements have been satisfied. 29 The court in
Wright used notice as the determinative factor.30
Fair notice seems to be a useful and reasonable simplifica-
tion of the investigation and conciliation requirement.31 In
EEOC v. American National Bank,3 2 the court found the defen-
dant's knowledge of race discrimination charges against one of
its branch banks adequate to notify the defendant that the same
type of charge might be alleged against the entire bank.3 1 In
Wright, the EEOC raised issues which were unrelated to charges
filed by the individual victims. These issues were properly
pleaded in the class action complaint, however, and the court
determined they were properly presented on appeal.3 '
After reviewing its jurisdiction, the court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's findings that: (1) the seniority system
was bona fide; 5 (2) Olin did not discriminate in job assign-
ments;36 and (3) Olin promoted employees on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis.37 The court then proceeded to address the claim re-
lating to Olin's fetal vulnerability plan. 8
Olin's fetal vulnerability plan categorized jobs as either re-
stricted, controlled, or unrestricted. These categories allegedly
correspond to the level of risk to women and to the fetuses they
may carry, based on the amount of exposure to toxic chemicals
1976).
29. See 697 F.2d at 1177.
30. Id. (citing EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 923 (1982)).
31. The danger in this approach, however, is that it may circumvent the legislative
purpose of avoiding unnecessary litigation through voluntary compliance. See Stebbins
v. Continental Ins. Co., 442 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
32. 652 F.2d at 1176.
33. This is particularly true since notice of the charge was forwarded by the local
assistant vice president to the vice president at the main office in Portsmouth. 652 F.2d
at 1186. Furthermore, the local bank was subject to unified supervision and con-
trol-including its hiring practices. Id.
34. 697 F.2d at 1179.
35. Id. at 1179-80.
36. Id. at 1180-81.
37. Id. at 1181.
38. Id. at 1182-92.
[Vol. 36
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in the particular job classification. All "fertile""9 women are pre-
cluded from employment in restricted jobs absent individual
proof of infertility. Non-pregnant women may work in controlled
jobs after making written acknowledgement of potential risk;
pregnant women may work in controlled jobs if approved by
Olin. Unrestricted jobs are open to all women.40
The court recognized the need to determine "the proper
conceptual framework for analysis. ' 41 Title VII cases are usually
analyzed by one of two general frameworks: disparate impact or
disparate treatment. The disparate treatment framework applies
to cases of discrimination in which the employer intentionally
treats an employee or class of employees differently because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or out of a desire for
reprisal. Proof of discriminatory intent in these cases is
critical.42
In cases of overt discrimination, the defendant employer ac-
knowledges different treatment based on a protected classifica-
tion and seeks to justify the classification as a "bona fide occu-
pational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise. '4 This af-
firmative defense, provided for in Title VII, is known as the bfoq
(bona fide occupational qualification) defense. The bfoq defense
is narrowly drawn44 and is strictly interpreted.45 In cases of cov-
39. All women between the ages of 5 and 63 are presumed to be fertile. Id. at 1182.
40. Id. The scientific and medical evidence offered by Olin to justify its program was
grossly inadequate in light of available information. Id.
41. Id. at 1183.
42. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1981).
44. By its own statutory terms, the bfoq defense is limited to cases of discrimination
based on sex, religion, or national origin only. Id, Thus, assuming it is reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of their particular businesses, the Presbyterian Church may
lawfully discriminate against the Buddhist monk who seeks to fill its pulpit, the Chinese
restaurant may lawfully discriminate against the Japanese-born student who wants to be
a cook; however, it seems the Hollywood studio may not limit itself to black actors when
casting a film on nineteenth century American slavery. The classic example of bfoq ap-
plication in the context of sexual discrimination is the sperm bank that, for obvious rea-
sons, limits itself to male donors.
45. The Supreme Court case of Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), is one of
the few cases in which the bfoq defense has been successfully applied. The Court in
Dothard found that a female prison guard's "relative ability to maintain order in a male,
maximum-security, unclassified penetentiary ... could be directly reduced by her wo-
manhood." 433 U.S. at 335. The Court found that the primary reason for this reduced
19851 183
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ert discrimination, the applicable Title VII proof formula, set
forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,46 seeks to "progres-
sively sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of
intentional discrimination.'
' 7
Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first establish
a prima facie case of disparate treatment."" The defendant must
then offer legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his actions.49
To prevail, the plaintiff must rebut the defendant's justifications
by showing that they were a mere pretext for illegal
discrimination."
In contrast, the disparate impact framework applies to cases
of employer discrimination which are based on a neutral policy
or neutral factors. Although neutral discrimination is not pro-
hibited by Title VII, plaintiffs in these cases either claim that
the neutral policy is a mere pretext for illegal discrimination or
that it has an unnecessary impact upon a protected class.5 1 The
standard defense to disparate impact claims is business neces-
sity. Under this defense, the employer seeks to demonstrate that
the neutral basis of discrimination is substantially related to job
performance. The employer has the burden of proving this rela-
tionship once the Title VII claimant has shown a statistically
significant disproportionate impact on a protected class.2
ability was a high risk of sexual attack unique to female guards. Id. at 335-36. Dissenting
Justices Brennan and Marshall were not convinced of any reduced ability. Id. at 345-46.
The dissenting Justices also objected to the majority using the prison's overcrowded,
unconstitutional, and otherwise abnormal conditions to enhance the perceived risk to
female guards and simultaneously considering the prison within the statutorily required
"normal operation of ... business." Id. at 341-42. In the recent district court case of
Griffin v. Mich. Dept. of Corrections, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639 (E.D. Mich.
1982), the conditions and risks of the Dothard prison were distinguished and the defen-
dants ordered immediately to remove the illegal and artificial barriers to the female
plaintiff's promotion.
46. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
47. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981).
48. 697 F.2d at 1183 (disparate treatment may be established "by proof of the pro-
gram's existence and intended operation").
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The classic example of this type of analysis is Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, the Supreme Court held that the use in personnel actions of
standardized test scores and high school graduation requirements, not substantially re-
lated to job performance, constitutes illegal discrimination when such requirements oper-
ate to disqualify blacks at a substantially higher rate than whites.
52. See B. SCHLEi & P. GRossiAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMNATION LAW 1328-30 (2d
[Vol. 36
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In Wright, the court of appeals held the disparate impact
framework and business necessity defense to be best suited to
the fetal vulnerability issue." The court properly dismissed the
McDonnell Douglas disparate proof scheme,5 4 because the piv-
otal issue in Wright was not intention but justification.55 The
court based its selection of the disparate impact framework/bus-
iness necessity defense, instead of the overt discrimination
framework/bfoq defense, on two factors.
First, the court noted that Olin had expressed its fetal vul-
nerability policy in gender-neutral terms.56 The court then ac-
knowledged the consistent judicial application of the disparate
impact formula to policies which are superficially neutral but
which result in discriminatory consequences when applied.57 The
court rejected the appellant's argument that the 1978 Pregnancy
Amendment to Title VIP5 converted the neutral policy into an
overtly discriminatory policy.5 9 Unless Olin's policy is expressed
in terms of "ability to conceive" rather than "pregnancy," the
court's rejection may have been premature, 0 since the language
of the Amendment is broad enough to include pregnancy, child-
birth, and "related medical conditions." '61
Second, the court noted that application of the overt dis-
crimination framework would limit Olin to the narrow bfoq de-
fense6 2 and deprive the employer of an opportunity to present
its legitimate justifications under the broader scope of business
necessity.6" This reason is considerably weakened, however, be-
cause the court acknowledged that the overt discriminator is
limited to the bfoq defense by tradition rather than by doctrinal
necessity.
4
ed. 1983).
53. 697 F.2d at 1185.
54. See text accompanying notes 48-50.
55. 697 F.2d at 1185 n.20.
56. Id. at 1186. The specific terms of the policy are not revealed, however, and the
court admits that their neutrality might be subject to logical dispute. Id.
57. Id.
58. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976)).
59. 697 F.2d at 1183-84 n.17.
60. See B. ScHmEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 52, at 402-03.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1981).
62. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
63. 697 F.2d at 1185-86 n.21.
64. Id.
19851
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After identifying the disparate impact/business necessity
theory "as the appropriate one to apply in resolution of the fetal
vulnerability issue, '65 the court of appeals held "that the evi-
dence of the existence and operation of the fetal vulnerability
program established as a matter of law a prima facie case of Ti-
tle VII violation."6 6 The claimants urged the court to find, as a
matter of law, that the relevant business necessity defense had
not been established. 7 The court declined to do so, stating:
Though the evidence deduced on trial would not suffice to sup-
port a finding of business necessity ... we do not think it
would be fair to resolve the case by our first instance applica-
tion of the defense on the present record .... [W]e think the
proper course is to remand for further proceedings confined
solely to that issue .... 68
The court then addressed the application of the business neces-
sity defense "to the unique circumstances presented by this em-
ployment practice."6 9
A business necessity is any legitimate practice essential to
the safe and efficient operation of the business.70 The woman
who is eight months pregnant may be an inefficient and unsafe
bodyguard; the same is not necessarily true six to eight weeks
after conception. Assuming efficiency is not affected, safety is
the controlling factor. The safety of the female employee herself,
however, is not a proper concern of the employer under Title
VII. Title VII protects the woman's right to choose her own
work environment, regardless of danger.
The safety of others, coworkers and customers (e.g., the per-
son contracting for the services of the bodyguard), is a legitimate
concern of the employer because the employer will be responsi-
ble for any harm to these third parties. The employer's duty to-
ward unborn children is more similar to the duty toward these
third party invitees and licensees than it is to the duty toward
the autonomous first party worker. The court in Wright denied
65. Id. at 1186.
66. Id. at 1187.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1188.
71. 433 U.S. at 335.
[Vol. 36
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss2/2
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
the mother's right to make the same dangerous choice for her
unborn child that she might make for herself.72 This denial
seems inconsistent with the court's acknowledgement of
women's constitutionally recognized right to abort unborn chil-
dren-7 3 --an issue the court understandably avoids. 4 As long as
the employer knows a woman might have a child, the employer
does have a legitimate concern with protecting the health of that
child who is legitimately on business premises and exposed to
workplace hazards. Employers may be particularly concerned by
their potential liability to a child subsequently born with a
deformity.7
5
The court in Wright held "that under appropriate circum-
stances an employer may, as a matter of business necessity, im-
pose otherwise impermissible restrictions on employment oppor-
tunities that are reasonably required to protect the health of
unborn children of women workers against hazards of the work-
place. 1 76 The court then outlined how the defense may be estab-
lished at trial.77 The court in Wright placed a heavy burden on
employers: the employer must prove by objective, scientific evi-
dence that a significant risk exists which is substantially con-
fined to women.78 Although Olin failed to make such a showing
at the original trial, evidence is available to support its position,
and Olin should be able to meet this burden on remand. If Olin
is successful, its prima facie establishment of the business neces-
sity defense can only be rebutted by the plaintiff's demonstra-
tion of less intrusive alternatives. 9
In Wright, the Fourth Circuit set a national precedent by
establishing the framework appropriate in future fetal vulnera-
bility cases. The court's analysis is thorough, well-organized, and
should be helpful to attorneys faced with Title VII cases involv-
ing the issue of fetal vulnerability.
72. 697 F.2d at 1189 n.25.
73. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74. 697 F.2d at 1189 n.25.
75. See Sloan, Employers Tort Liability When a Female Employee is Exposed to
Harmful Substances, 3 EMPLOYEE REL. J. 506 (1978); Finneran, supra note 2, at 228-30.
76. 697 F.2d at 1189-90.
77. Id. at 1190.
78. Id. at 1190-91.
79. Id. at 1191.
1985]
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B. Title VII and the Sexually Offensive Work Environment:
A Warranty of Workability
In Katz v. Dole,80 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit adopted the view8' that sexual harassment, in itself, can
constitute a form of discrimination forbidden by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.82 The Fourth Circuit thus followed the
trend established by other courts in recognizing the work envi-
ronment as part of the "terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment"8 3 regardless of any related deprivation of tangible job
benefits.84 The Fourth Circuit also suggested an appropriate
modification of the Title VII plaintiff's standard prima facie
case.85
Deborah Ann Katz was formerly a federal air traffic control-
ler with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a division
of the Department of Transportation which reports to Secretary
80. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
81. Id. at 256 (adopting the view of Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
82. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1971).
83. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(1976).
84. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir.
1979)(Title VII is violated when female employees are required to wear uniforms while
males are not), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v.
City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977)(segregated employee eating clubs, con-
doned by employer, create a discriminatory work environment and violate Title VII),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.
1976)(white employee has standing to sue employer who discriminates against blacks be-
cause of employee's statutory right to discrimination-free work environment), cert. de-
nied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971)(employer's dis-
crimination against Hispanic clients created a discriminatory environment for Hispanic
employees), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972); Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980)(employer's failure to eliminate sexual harass-
ment which led to plaintiff's resignation violates Title VII); United States v. City of
Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1978)(racial abuse and insults violate statutory
right to work in an environment free of discrimination); Steadman v. Hundley, 421 F.
Supp. 53 (N.D. Ill. 1976)(racial slurs may violate Title VII); Compston v. Borden, Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976)(supervisor's religious slurs held to violate Title VII);
Continental Can Co. v. Minnesota, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980) (sexually derogatory
statements and sexual advances of coworkers led to plaintiff's resignation and consti-
tuted illegal discrimination); but cf. Halpert v. Wertheim & Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(derogatory sexual language directed at plaintiff held not to
violate Title VII because it was customary business practice to use such language); see
generally Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Title VII's Imperfect Relief, 6 J.
CoRp. L. 625, 633-37 (1981).
85. 709 F.2d at 255-56. See infra note 119.
10
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Elizabeth Dole.86 Katz entered the federal air traffic controller
training program in 1974 and was employed by the FAA as a
fully trained air traffic controller from August 1980 to Septem-
ber 1981. Katz was assigned to the Washington Air Traffic Con-
trol Center in 1977. She worked with controller crew IF until
May 1981 when she was transferred to another crew at her own
request. While she was working with crew 1F, her supervisor was
John J. Sullivan.
7
Katz commenced her discrimination suit on June 9, 1981,
after a failure of the FAA's administrative remedies.8, Katz al-
leged she had been subject to illegal sexual harassment and dis-
parate personnel actions based on gender discrimination. Most
of the alleged harassment consisted of verbal abuse by male co-
workers and Sullivan. Additionally, Katz was subject to sexual
advances by at least one coworker. Katz' complaints to Sulli-
van's superior and other FAA supervisory personnel were met
with indifference or mere acknowledgement.8 9 The court of ap-
peals reversed the trial court, and held that "Katz was entitled
to prevail on her claim of sexual harassment." 90 Katz also com-
plained of disparate treatment on the job. The defendant, how-
ever, demonstrated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
each action,91 and the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's judgment for the defendant on these claims.92
Courts, commentators, and federal agencies have divided
sexual harassment into two categories: 93 "condition of work" and
"quid pro quo."' 94 "Quid pro quo" describes the form of harass-
86. 49 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)(FAA Administrator reports to Transportation
Secretary).
87. 709 F.2d at 253.
88. The EEOC has developed guidelines for equal employment opportunity proce-
dures, programs, and remedies in federal agencies. It also reviews each development and
individual cases. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613 (1983).
89. 709 F.2d at 253-54.
90. Id. at 256, 257.
91. See infra note 130.
92. 709 F.2d at 256-57.
93. The two-category approach to sexual harassment is an oversimplification. A con-
tinuum would be a more accurate framework for analysis of sexual harassment cases and
their outcomes. Because most cases can be placed in one of the two categories described
in the main text, the analysis may be simplified without incorrect results. This discussion
will generally follow the two-category approach as the cases do.
94. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 n.18 (11th Cir. 1982)(citing C.
MAcKINNON, SExuA.L HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32-47 (1979)); 29 C.F.R. §
1985]
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ment in which an employer or supervisor makes participation in
sexual activity an express or implied condition to continued em-
ployment or favorable treatment. The "condition of work" form
of harassment consists of those situations when the workplace is
"poisoned"9 5  by discriminatory references, innuendo, and
actions.
Title VII prohibits sex discrimination in employment.96 Per-
sonnel actions based on an employee's participation in sexual ac-
tivities ("quid pro quo" harassment) violate Title VII because
they are in fact based upon gender.9 7 The Fourth Circuit recog-
nized this form of Title VII harassment action in Garber v.
Saxon Business Products, Inc.95 The Katz decision, however, is
the first Fourth Circuit decision to deal with "condition of work"
harassment and to explore sexual harassment actions in
general.99
The general provision of Title VII, applicable to private em-
ployers, prohibits discrimination with respect to the "terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment." 100 Recent opinions' 0 ' have
expanded the scope of this general provision and have brought
"condition of work" harassment under the Title VII umbrella 0 2
1604.11(a)(1983) (similar analysis in EEOC guidelines); see also B. SCHLEI & P. GF.oss-
MAN, supra note 52, at 421-23.
95. The term "poisoned" was borrowed from Judge Wright's opinion in Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
96. See infra notes 106 and 107.
97. The advances are in fact based on sex except in the rare instance when the
harasser is bisexual and harasses both sexes with equal vigor. See 641 F.2d at 942 n.7
and accompanying text; Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Wright v.
Methodist Youth Services, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 309-10 (N.D. EL 1981) (example of how
homosexual harassment is also based on sex); see also C. MACKINNON, supra note 94, at
200-01.
98. 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). For discussions of Garber and other early sexual
harassment cases, see Schupp, Sexual Harassment Under Title VII: The Legal Status,
32 LAB. L.J. 238, 238-47 (1981); Significant Development, New EEOC Guidelines on Dis-
crimination Because of Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment Under Title
VII, 61 B.U.L. REv. 535, 548 (1981)[hereinafter Significant Development]; Goodman,
Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance Travelled and the Distance
Yet to Go, 10 CAP. U.L. REv. 445, 459-60 (1981); Note, Williams v. Civiletti: Expanding
the Causes of Action in Sexual Harassment Claims, 10 CAP. U.L. REv. 641, 642-44
(1981) [hereinafter Note].
99. The court noted that Katz' sexual harassment claim involved application of Ti-
tle VH "in an area almost totally unexplored by our previous decisions." 709 F.2d at 257.
100. See infra note 107 for statutory language.
101. See supra note 84.
102. This expansion of Title VII protection was an evolutionary process. The inter-
12
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by providing that a Title VII action for sexual harassment may
exist even if no specific, tangible personnel action is related to
the harassment.103 These opinions recognize the intent of Title
VII to protect the worker's right to a peaceful, productive, and
discrimination-free work environment.104 Title VII has become a
warranty of workability. 0 5
Although the statutory language which applies to federal
employers prohibits only "personnel actions affecting employ-
ees" based on sex, 0 6 courts have expanded the scope of this pro-
hibition to the full extent of the general Title VII provision ap-
plicable to private employers. 0 7 This expansion allows the
federally-employed plaintiff to take advantage of the evolution
mediate step in the evolution involved constructive termination cases, and the evolution
of this warranty of workability paralleled that of the warranty of habitability in the land-
lord-tenant area of real property law.
The implied warranty of habitability evolved through two simple steps. First, courts
began to allow tenants early termination of leases when the conditions of the leased
premises were untenantable under the theory that tenants' rights to quiet enjoyment and
peaceful possession were violated. This early termination of the leasehold estate is gener-
ally referred to as "constructive eviction." See Net Realty Holding Trust v. Nelson, 33
Conn. Sup. 22, 25, 358 A.2d 365, 366 (1976). Second, the courts began to imply a war-
ranty of habitability to effect the public policy of protecting tenants' rights, to effect the
legislative intent of the housing codes, and to protect the lessee/consumer from unfair
bargains. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, -51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); see
generally Abbot, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration,
56 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1976). It is interesting to note that Judge Wright wrote the ground-
breaking opinions in both Bundy and Javins.
103. The courts have frequently used the concept of constructive termination as a
means to afford Title VII relief, particularly before the general recognition that Title VII
protects the worker's rights to a discrimination-free work environment. See Significant
Development, supra note 98, at 544-45. It should also be noted that the recognition of a
warranty of workability like the warranty of habitability gives effect to an underlying
legislative intent. See infra note 114.
104. See Judge Goldberg's opinion in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). See also infra note 114.
105. "Warranty of Workability" is the author's term for Title VII protection. See
supra notes 102 and 103.
106. The relevant language states: "All personnel actions affecting employees... in
those units of the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the com-
petitive service . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)(1976).
107. See, e.g., 641 F.2d at 934. The general provision states: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of such individual's ... sex ... " 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
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of the warranty of workability under the general provision.
The success of sexual harassment actions brought by federal
employees has depended on a two-step expansion of the scope of
Title VII. In Bundy v. Jackson,10 8 the first successful action of
this type, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit followed these two steps in extending the scope of Title VII
from the "quid pro quo" form of harassment, previously ad-
dressed in Barnes v. Costle 09 and Garber,110 to the "condition of
work" form of harassment.1 First, the court interpreted the
provisions of Title VII specifically dealing with federal employ-
ment 12 in terms of the general Title VII coverage of "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment."1 " Second, the court
decided that sexual harassment which poisons the workplace is
sexual discrimination with respect to the "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment."1 4 The court of appeals in Katz fol-
lowed this analysis.11 5
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Katz decision is
its analysis of the burden of proof. In contrast to the standard
Title VII case, in sexual harassment cases, the factual question
of intent is not at all elusive.1 " The discriminatory intent in
108. 641 F.2d at 934.
109. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
110. 552 F.2d at 1032.
111. See 641 F.2d at 943-45.
112. See supra note 106.
113. 641 F.2d at 942.
114. Id. at 943-46. The court's determination in Bundy that "condition of work"
sexual harassment is discrimination with respect to the "terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment" was based in large part on Judge Goldberg's analysis in the Fifth Circuit
case of Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
For a discussion of the court's reliance on Rogers, see Note, supra note 84, at 635. In that
ethnic discrimination case, Judge Goldberg recognized the need to protect the em-
ployee's psychological well-being from "a working environment heavily charged with...
discrimination." 454 F.2d at 238. Judge Goldberg noted the breadth with which Congress
defined discrimination to allow effectuation of the underlying congressional purpose-to
eliminate discrimination in all of its noxious forms. Id. This liberal reading of the statute
has eliminated any need for Congress to amend the statute and specifically include the
harassment form of discrimination.
115. 709 F.2d at 254.
116. The court in Bundy stated that sexual harassment is always intentional. 641
F.2d at 945. The Katz opinion watered down this declaration to "almost always." 709
F.2d at 255. Katz does, however, leave the presumption intact and shifts the focus of
inquiry accordingly. Id. The analogous area of racial harassment provides further evi-
dence of the shift of inquiry with a presumption of intent. For example, in Cariddi v.
Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977), the court indicated
14
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"quid pro quo" cases is clear from the nature of the harass-
ment.117 In "condition of work" cases, discriminatory intent is
easily inferred from nontrivial harassment., Thus, the focus of
inquiry shifts from motivations and justifications to the exis-
tence and degree of the harassment, and the employer's liability
for it.
119
Although the factual element of intent may be easily estab-
lished in most sexual harassment claims, 20 the same is not nec-
essarily true of the employee's additional general disparate
treatment claims. The court in Bundy decided that the em-
ployee's general disparate treatment claims should not be ana-
lyzed independently of sexual harassment claims, thus confer-
ring a procedural advantage upon the plaintiff who adds a claim
of disparate treatment to a basic sexual harassment case. Al-
though not specifically authorized by the Supreme Court in Mc-
Donnell Douglas,21 Bundy provides that when an employee who
has proven sexual harassment makes out a prima facie case of
some other form of sexual discrimination, the employer must re-
that the plaintiff need only prove a certain level of persuasiveness in the harassment,
and discriminatory intent would be implied. See a"so Steadman v. Hundley, 421 F. Supp.
53 (N.D. IlM. 1976).
117. See text accompanying notes 93-95.
118. See, e.g., 421 F. Supp. at 53.
119. The court in Katz proposed a two-prong formula in sexual harassment cases
which shifts the emphasis from intent to. existence, significance, and liability:
First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that sexually harassing
actions took place, and if this is done, the employer may rebut the showing
either directly, by proving that the events did not take place, or indirectly, by
showing that they were isolated or genuinely trivial. Second, the plaintiff must
show that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment, and
took no effectual action to correct the situation. This showing can also be re-
butted by the employer directly, or by pointing to prompt remedial action rea-
sonably calculated to end the harassment.
709 F.2d at 256. The court failed to specify the level of harassment required by the first
prong, and thereby appears to have lowered the plaintiff's initial burden of production.
Under this formula, a showing of even merely trivial harassment serves to shift the bur-
den to the defendant. Other language in the case, however, indicates that it was Katz'
unrebutted showing of nontrivial harassment that satisfied the requirements of her Title
VII claim. Id. It is doubtful that the court intended to lower the plaintiff's burden of
proof below that generally required to avoid summary judgment.
120. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
121. The McDonnell Douglas opinion noted that the elements of the plaintiff's
prima facie case would vary with different fact situations, but the Court made no men-
tion of any variation in the basic formula or level of proof required for defendant's re-
buttal. 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
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but this second claim by clear and convincing evidence of non-
discriminatory motive, 122 rather than by the standard prepon-
derance of the evidence.' 23 The stricter proof requirement of
Bundy seems to be based upon either a strong presumption that
a link exists between proven harassment and subsequent dispa-
rate treatment 24 or a policy of punishing an employer shown to
have discriminated against or harassed an employee. 25
The United States Supreme Court decision in Texas Dept.
of Community Affairs v. Burdine,26 decided less than three
months after Bundy,27 rejects any increase in the employer's
burden of rebuttal. 28 Although Burdine involved simple sex dis-
crimination and not sexual harassment, the Court's reasoning is
equally applicable to Katz. First, the Court observed that the
defendant's explanation must be clear and reasonably specific to
rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination; conse-
quently, the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to
show pretext. Second, the defendant will naturally attempt to
persuade the trier of fact of his innocence even without the for-
mal burden of persuasion. Third, the Title VII plaintiff's access
to EEOC files and liberal federal discovery rules should allow
the plaintiff to demonstrate pretext easily if it exists. 129 The pro-
cedural advantage provided plaintiffs under Bundy may not
122. 641 F.2d at 952.
123. McDonnell Douglas specified a preponderance of the evidence. 402 U.S. at 804.
124. Although the Bundy requirement of clear and convincing proof of nondiscrimi-
nation seems reasonable, Judge Wright failed to give it adequate justification. Judge
Wright relied on language from the racial discrimination case of Day v. Mathews, 530
F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Bundy, he summarized, "We stressed in Day that since
the employer's own proved discriminatory actions were largely responsible for the plain-
tiff's typical dilemma of having to prove the motive underlying the employer's past ac-
tion, 'any resulting uncertainty [should] be resolved against the party whose action gave
rise to the problem.'" Bundy, 641 F.2d at 952 (quoting Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083,
1086 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(footnote omitted and bracketed change by the court)). This simply
rewords the presumption of a link between proven harassment and specific employer
actions, and does not justify that presumption.
125. The divergence from the historical allocation seems to be based on a policy of
punishment found in Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d at 1082, and Baxter v. Savannah Sugar
Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974). The
employer shown to have discriminated or harassed is punished by the requirement of a
higher level of proof to rebut an employee's separate claim of disparate treatment.
126. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
127. Bundy was decided January 12, 1981; Burdine was decided March 4, 1981.
128. 450 U.S. at 256-58.
129. Id. at 258.
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have survived Burdine; it is not found in Katz.
The Katz decision impliedly rejects any presumption of a
link because the court analyzed the disparate treatment and sex-
ual harassment claims independently and found "no novel legal
questions"130 in the plaintiff's disparate treatment claims.
Although not found in Katz and disavowed in Burdine, the
procedural advantage of Bundy may be justified in some cases.
The purpose of the standard Title VII proof formula is to
sharpen the focus of the inquiry on the elusive question of dis-
criminatory intent.'13 The plaintiff who has proven illegal sexual
harassment (a breach of the warranty of workability) has al-
ready shown some discriminatory intent. If there is an inherent
nexus between the intent to harass and the intent to discrimi-
nate in subsequent disparate employee treatment, employers
should be held absolutely liable for all claims of subsequent dis-
parate treatment. This stern approach has been suggested by
one author as the best means to deter harassment and to elimi-
nate offensive and hostile work environments."3 2 Although sev-
eral courts have held employers strictly liable for unrebutted
discrimination claims, 3 3 no court has held an employer abso-
lutely liable based on an irrebuttable presumption of a discrimi-
130. 709 F.2d at 257. Indeed, the court in Katz found the actions justified by sound
management policies and guidelines. Katz' claim of scheduling difficulties was overcome
by the FAA's unrebutted, articulated reason for those difficulties-her ongoing training
program. Id. at 256. Likewise, her transfer requests were denied based on a general pol-
icy against transfers (the legitimacy of which was not considered) and the absence of an
open position. Id. The temporary denial of her request for "traumatic injury leave" was
apparently due to confusion over new agency guidelines and not discrimination. Id. The
employee's refusal to put through Katz' personal telephone call to a coworker, while the
coworker was on the job, was also based on an agency policy, and the fact that Katz'
supervisor passed the message along indicated that no discriminatory harm was in-
tended. Id. at 256-57.
131. See text accompanying note 47.
132. Note, supra note 98, at 653-55. The author, however, fails to distinguish fully
between strict liability, when the defendant bears the burden of rebutting the presump-
tion of discrimination, and abolute liability, when the presumption of discrimination is
irrebutable. The author indicates that the court in Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp.
1387 (D.D.C. 1980), holds the harassing employer absolutely liable without the usual "es-
cape hatch defense provisions." Note, supra note 98, at 652 n.82 and accompanying text.
Williams v. Civiletti, however, merely holds the employer strictly liable and requires
disclosure by supervisors who intend to take detrimental personnel actions against the
employee they have harassed. 487 F. Supp. at 1387.
133. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982); Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 487 F. Supp. at 1387.
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natory nexus."'
The existence of such a nexus may vary with the form or
degree of harassment. "Quid pro quo" harassment is always pre-
sumptively linked to an intent to discriminate in subsequent
employee treatment; the link is explicitly laid out or clearly im-
plied in advance to the employee by the employer or supervisor.
This clear or explicit link defines "quid pro quo" harassment.13 5
"Condition of work" harassment, on the other hand, is not pre-
sumptively related to subsequent adverse employee treatment;
there is no clearly expressed link.136
The existence of a discriminatory nexus in "quid pro quo"
cases justifies the procedural advantage found in Bundy,37 but
the Katz approach will impose liability on the same guilty em-
ployers without altering the traditional allocation of burdens. 3
There is no discriminatory nexus in "condition of work" cases,
and it would be unfair to impute to the innocent employer the
discriminatory intent of its relatively autonomous workers."3 9
Under these circumstances, disparate treatment claims should.
definitely be analyzed separately, as were the claims in Katz.1'
134. This is notwithstanding the interpretation of Williams v. Civiletti discussed
supra note 132.
135. See text accompanying notes 93-95.
136. Id.
137. See text accompanying notes 122-23.
138. The difference in the rebuttal burdens placed upon defendants under Bundy
and Katz may have more philosophical than practical significance. The innocent defen-
dant, whose actions are truly justified, should be able to meet either level of proof. For
example, the proof offered by the defendant in the Katz case, see supra note 130, would
seem sufficient to meet either level of proof. The guilty defendant might be able to rebut
the plaintiff's prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence; once the plaintiff
shows that the rebuttal is mere pretext, however, the defendant must meet the higher
standard of clear and convincing proof. Historically, the ultimate burden (persuasion)
has remained on the plaintiff. See 450 U.S. at 253. The defendant's increased burden of
rebuttal appears to shift the ultimate burden of persuasion to the defendant. Burdine
holds that the ultimate burden should remain on the plaintiff and that only the burden
of production should shift back and forth.
139. This refusal to presume intent is particularly reasonable when supervisory per-
sonnel are not involved and workers enjoy a great deal of freedom on the job. Any un-
fairness of imputing intent disappears, however, when the employer is on notice of har-
assment and does little or nothing to eliminate it. See Note, New EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment Under Title
VII, 61 B.U.L. REv. 535, 545-46 (1981). For a discussion of employer liability in general
under the EEOC guidelines and numerous liability theories, see generally id.
140. The court in Katz analyzed the disparate treatment claims independently of
the harassment claim.
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The plaintiff who suceeds in a sexual harassment claim may
seek injunctive relief, nominal damages, and attorney's fees;141
this potential liability alone should warn an employer to im-
prove the work environment. Employers guilty of "quid pro
quo" harassment or gross or habitual "condition of work" har-
assment could be subject to absolute liability or a higher burden
of rebuttal under a strict, Bundy approach. Such an approach,
however, would unnecessarily and perhaps unfairly shift the
burden to the defendant. As an alternative in these cases of seri-
ous harassment, a new statutory tort might be created under Ti-
tle VII or punitive damages might be allowed. The increased
likelihood of significant liability might increase the responsive-
ness of employers to harassment problems.
The Katz decision gives clear Fourth Circuit recognition to
Title VII actions of harassed employees. Sexual harassment is an
area of new impression in the Fourth Circuit, and the decision
appropriately recognizes the Bundy expansion of Title VII with-
out any unnecessary or unfair alteration of traditional burdens.
The court's two-step analysis142 sets forth the essential elements
of the plaintiff's case and makes clear the defendant's obliga-
tions in rebuttal. Although Katz is a sexual harassment case, the
sound analysis provided by the court could apply to all claims of
discriminatory work environments.
II. WILDCAT STRIKES AND LOCAL UNION LIABILITY
In determining the liability of a labor union for an illegal
work stoppage in an action under section 301 of the Labor Man-
141. Title VII generally limits plaintiffs to equitable relief: reinstatement, awards of
back pay, and declaratory or injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Rewards for
mental suffering and emotional distress are not allowed under Title VII. See 641 F.2d
934, 946 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268,
272 (9th Cir. 1981); Garner v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978). The courts
may, however, award nominal damages and attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)(1976);
see, e.g., Joshi v. Florida State Univ., 646 F.2d 981, 991 n.33 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 972 (1982). Because of the limited nature of Title VII relief, some real or sub-
stantive damages must be recovered under disparate treatment claims or state tort ac-
tions such as invasion of privacy or assault and battery. For a discussion of these alterna-
tives, see Note, Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co.: Damages for Sexual Harassment-Title
VII and State Tort Law, 10 CAP. U.L. REv. 657 (1981).
142. See supra note 119.
19851
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agement Relations Act (LMRA), 13 courts have recognized two
theories of liability: "mass action" 144 and agency. The Fourth
Circuit case of Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, UMWA,
45
illustrates both theories of union liability.
Consolidation Coal Company employed approximately 400
workers, all members of Local 1702, at its Blacksville No. 2 Mine
in Mongolia County, West Virginia. The coal company and Lo-
cal 1702 were parties to the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1978. This agreement provided that the integrity
of the contract would be maintained, but did not contain an ex-
press no-strike clause.
146
143. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). The LMRA (Taft-Hartley Act), § 301, states, in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion... may be brought in any district court of the United States ....
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter . . .shall be bound by the acts of its
agents....
(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is act-
ing as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person responsi-
ble for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actu-
ally authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
144. The "mass action" theory was first articulated by Judge Goldsborough in
United States v. International Union, UMWA, 77 F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1948). In Inter-
national Union over 350,000 union members throughout the country walked off the job
in unison. Judge Goldsborough, presented with evidence of prior communications be-
tween the international and local unions, concluded that someone had necessarily di-
rected the strike. Of particular concern was the fact that union officials might covertly
organize a strike, but be immune from liability. "Mass action" theory has been employed
in numerous cases since its inception. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 598
F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1979); Carbon Fuel Co. v. Locals 6572, 7626 and 2236, UMWA, 582
F.2d 1346 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 212 (1979); Eazor Express Inc.
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975); Vulcan Materials Co. v.
United Steelworkers of Am., 430 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1970); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Lo-
cal 1261, UMWA, 500 F. Supp. 72 (D. Utah 1980); Airco Speer Carbon-Graphite v. Local
502, Int'l Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of Am., 494 F. Supp. 872
(W.D. Pa. 1980); United States v. International Union, UMWA, 77 F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C.
1948). For a historical review of the "mass action" doctrine, see generally Fishman and
Brown, Union Responsibility for Wildcat Strikes, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1017, 1025-29
(1975).
145. 709 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 487 (1983)(No. 83-510).
146. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, UMWA, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2907, 2908-
09 (N.D.W. Va. 1982); see also Brief of Appellant at 2-3. The appellant's brief notes that
integrity clauses similar to that found in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
of 1978 "have been given the same effect as an explicit 'no-strike' clause." Id. at n.8
(citing Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S. 368 (1974)).
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On January 30, 1981, all members, including officers and
committeemen, of Local 1702 joined in an isolated wildcat strike
over an arbitrable issue.147 There was no picketing. The district
court issued a temporary restraining order later that day di-
recting the union to return to work. Although the union officials
undertook some actions to return the members to work, they did
not perform certain significant procedures, such as media publi-
cation of return-to-work orders.148 On the fifth day of the strike
the district court held the union, and its officers, committeemen,
and members, in civil contempt and assessed fines. 149 The strike
ended shortly thereafter. 150
Consolidation Coal Company brought an action for damages
against the local union under section 301 of the LMRA.51 The
district court held that the "mass action" theory was no longer a
viable theory of union liability after the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA. 5 2 As stated in Carbon Fuel,
"[t]he legislative history is clear that Congress limited the re-
147. 709 F.2d at 883. The provocation for the work stoppage was the suspension of a
union member who had allegedly attempted to steal company property. The district
court found that this issue was absolutely subject to arbitration under the parties' collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Id.
148. Id. at 884. Officers and committeemen went to the bathhouse at the beginning
of their shifts and encouraged the miners to return to work; they failed, however, to lead
the men into the mines. A union meeting was held on the third day of the strike, but no
motion to return to work was offered. Union officials did not arrange for media publicity
directing the members to return to work, nor did they threaten any members with disci-
plinary action. Finally, no officers or committeemen worked their shifts during the strike.
Id.
149. Id. at 883. The district court later reduced the fines against the officers and
committeemen, and completely remitted the fines assessed against individual members.
The Court of Appeals in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, 683 F.2d 827 (4th Cir.
1982), affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the fines. 709 F.2d at 883-84 n.2.
150. Id. at 883-84.
151. See supra note 143.
152. 444 U.S. 212 (1979). In Carbon Fuel, local labor unions engaged in a series of
unauthorized strikes in violation of their collective bargaining agreement. The regional
union's efforts to return the miners to work were unsuccessful. The employer brought an
action for damages under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, and judg-
ments were given against the local, district, and international unions. The Court of Ap-
peals, 582 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir. 1978), affirmed the judgment against the locals, but va-
cated the judgments against the district and international unions, holding that those
unions had no duty to use all reasonable means to prevent or terminate wildcat strikes,
and that, in the absence of evidence showing that the unions instigated, supported, rati-
fied, or encouraged the strikes, neither the district or international could be liable for
damages. The Supreme Court, 444 U.S. 212, reviewing only the Fourth Circuit's decision
in favor of the district and international unions, affirmed.
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sponsibility of unions for strikes in breach of contract to cases
when the union may be found responsible according to the com-
mon law rule of agency. ' 153 Although the district court acknowl-
edged that Carbon Fuel "did not involve a judgment against a
local union but only judgments against an international and dis-
trict union," 151 it nevertheless held that the agency theory is the
exclusive basis of imposing liability against unions at any level
of union hierarchy. The court further found that the evidence
was insufficient to establish union liability under common law
agency principles.155 Consolidation Coal Company appealed from
the district court's order.
1 56
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court and held that the "mass action" doctrine remains a viable
method of imposing liability for wildcat strikes.5 After
stressing that the holding of Carbon Fuel was limited to the lia-
bility of an international or district union, the court in Consoli-
dation Coal insisted upon the compatibility of that holding with
the "mass action" theory, which is confined to the local union
level. 158 The court in Consolidation Coal also held that the
union was liable under agency principles. The court indicated
that the union officials' "foreseeably ineffective" actions to halt
the strike created an inference of union approval or encourage-
ment. As a result, the union officials were deemed to have tacitly
ratified the strike.159 The decision is significant since it is the
first court of appeals decision to fully consider "mass action" af-
ter the Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel.6 '
Under "mass action" theory, a local union may be held lia-
ble when its members engage in a concerted strike even if it is
not formally authorized by the union. e1 The premise is that
153. 444 U.S. at 216.
154. 709 F.2d at 884. In Consolidation Coal, judgment was sought against the local
union only. Id.
155. Id. at 884-85.
156. 709 F.2d at 884.
157. Id. at 885.
158. Id. at 884-85. See also supra note 152.
159. 709 F.2d at 886.
160. In North River Energy Corp. v. Local 1926, UMWA, 664 F.2d 1184 (11th Cir.
1981), the court assumed, without discussion, that mass action theory still applied to
local unions.
161. 709 F.2d at 885. See also United States v. International Union, 77 F. Supp. 563,
566-67 (D.D.C. 1948).
[Vol. 36
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss2/2
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
large groups of people do not act collectively without leadership.
Thus, the mass action of the rank and file is regarded as union
action. Under agency theory, the union may be held responsible
if it can be shown that the union's agents at any level (i.e., gen-
erally, the union officials), acting within the scope of their ap-
parent authority, participated in, ratified, instigated, en-
couraged, condoned, or in some way directed the unauthorized
strike. The difference between the two theories is in the focus
and level of proof required. The former theory can be estab-
lished by the simple proof of concerted action by the rank and
file; the latter requires a more subtle analysis of union agents
and their activities.
In Carbon Fuel, the Supreme Court articulated a rule of
union liability which did not explictly differentiate between lo-
cal, district, or international unions.162 After the decision, uncer-
tainty arose about whether the "mass action" theory, as a basis
of liability distinct from agency doctrines, was still viable in the
wake of Carbon Fuel.16 3 A broad interpretation of the Supreme
Court's language is consistent with the statutory language1 4 and
legislative history6 5 of section 301, neither of which distinguish
between levels of unions.
The purpose of section 301, as explained by its sponsor,
Senator Taft, was to give both the employer and the union the
right to bring an action in federal court to enforce the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement 6 and to make the party re-
sponsible for violating the contract liable for damages resulting
from the violation. 6 7 Section 301(b) provides that, "Any labor
organization ... shall be bound by the acts of its agents." 68
Although the legislative history of section 301(b) nowhere ex-
pressly defines "agent," it was apparently not the legislative in-
162. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
163. See Airco Speer Carbon-Graphite v. Local 502, Int'l Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of Am., 494 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. Pa. 1980). The court concluded
that after Carbon Fuel, liability could not be imposed under the "mass action" theory.
However, the union in Airco was held liable under common law rules of agency of illegal
acts performed by union officials acting within the scope of their authority.
164. See supra note 143.
165. See, e.g., Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
at 23 [hereinafter cited as Legis. Hist. LMRA].
166. Id. at 1074.
167. Id. at 1146.
168. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1976).
19851
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tent to consider every employee an agent of the union6"' under
section 301(b), but rather to restrict the term to union officials.
Section 301(e) reflects the application of common law
agency tests to the activities of union officials and notes, "[I]n
determining whether any person is acting as an 'agent' . . . the
question of whether the specific acts were actually performed or
were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be
controlling. 1 70 Senator Taft explained 171 that section 301(e)
substituted the common law rules of agency1 72 for the more
stringent standard of United Brotherhood of Carpenters v.
United States.173 Although comments from Senator Ball seem to
suggest a lower standard of union liability in cases of violence
and picketing,1 7 4 it is clear from most of the legislative history
that union responsibility is to be proven only by directing the
common law agency test at the activities of the union officials.
Although "mass action" theory may seem clearly distin-
guishable from the agency principles intended to be applied in
these situations by the drafters of LMRA, the lines between
them sometimes blur. Consequently, courts have struggled with
the concepts 1 5 and have not always maintained nice analytical
169. Legis. Hist. LMRA at 1204.
170. 29 U.S.C. § 185(e)(1976).
171. 93 CONG. REc. 4022, 6858 (1947).
172. See 93 CONG. REC. 6859 (1947)(remarks of Sen. Taft):
[U]nion business agents or stewards, acting in their capacity of union officers,
may make their union guilty of an unfair labor practice when they engage in
conduct made an unfair labor practice in the bill, even though no formal au-
thorization has been taken by the union to authorize or approve such conduct.
93 CONG. REC. 6859 (1947).
173. 330 U.S. 395 (1947). This standard, which required clear proof that the union
actually participated in, gave prior authorization to, or ratified such illegal acts, was
based on the Norris La Guardia Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
174. The only suggestions in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act that un-
ions could be held responsible on somewhat less strict proof came from Senator Ball: "I
think that when there are mass picket lines, which usually produce acts of violence,
which are organized in front of the entrance of a plant, it is virtually always the union
leaders who brganize them," Legis. Hist. LMRA at 1020. Although the parallel between
Senator Ball's statement and the underlying premise of the "mass action" theory is obvi-
ous, it would be unrealistic to assert that Senator Ball's statement provides historical
support for the application of the "mass action" theory in a setting in which the only
illegal activity was an isolated illegal stoppage because Senator Ball's view was not refer-
enced in subsequent debates, later reports consistently referred to the ordinary rules of
agency, and Senator Ball's statement was by its own terms confined to instances of pick-
eting and violence, neither of which occurred in Consolidation Coal.
175. Illustrative of this fusion is Judge Mars' comment that, "Courts upholding lia-
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distinctions between agency and "mass action" theories. 17e In
fact, one court has recognized that the legal theories underlying
"mass action" and agency are essentially the same."'
If so, then the application of "mass action" theory may be
consistent with section 301. "Mass action" theory can be seen as
an evidentiary tool to apply accepted agency principles. Under
this theory, the union could be defined as the rank and file; 7"
wildcat strikes by the rank and file, therefore, are actions of the
union principal. In Consolidation Coal, the court concluded that
since "every member, including all officers and committeemen,
engaged in the illegal strike, the union [made] itself a part of the
illegality.'
7 9
If, on the other hand, the "mass action" and agency theories
are distinct, a segregated analysis must follow. Under agency
principles, a union is liable when "it makes itself a party to a
strike."1 10 Although the legislative history might indicate union
liability based upon mere participation by union officials,' 8 sev-
eral courts have not so held.1
8 2
Using a pure agency analysis, the court in Consolidation
Coal found the union liable based upon the union officials' tacit
ratification of the strike. Under agency principles, union officials
blity ... upon the mass action theory... have stressed the failure of the unions in-
volved to take steps, other than written and oral exhortation, speedily to terminate ille-
gal strikes as an indication of passive acquiescence in the strike." 520 F.2d at 964. This
comment indicates that courts applying "mass action" have simultaneously looked for
elements of tacit ratification under an agency standard.
176. See, e.g., North River Energy Corp. v. Local 1926, UMWA, 664 F.2d 1184 (11th
Cir. 1981); United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 598 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1979); Consolida-
tion Coal Co. v. Local 1261, UMWA, 500 F. Supp. 72 (D. Utah 1980).
177. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1261, UMWA, 500 F. Supp. at 75.
178. See, e.g., New Power Wire and Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1965)(the Second Circuit criticized the NLRB position that in order to establish the
liability of a union for violation of § 8b(1)(A), it is not sufficient that the rank and file
engaged in coercive conduct, but that participation of union officials must be shown; the
court suggested this was a "narrow conception of who constitutes] the union," id. at 72).
179. 709 F.2d at 886.
180. United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 598 F.2d at 365; Carbon Fuel Co. v. Lo-
cals 6572, 7626 and 2236, UMWA, 582 F.2d 1346, 1351 (4th Cir. 1978); United States
Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 519 F.2d 1249, 1255 (5th Cir. 1975); Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Local 1261, UMWA, 500 F. Supp. at 75.
181. See supra note 172.
182. North River Energy Corp. v. Local 1926, UMWA, 664 F.2d at 1192. The "mass
action" doctrine could not be employed in situations in which only the rank and file and
not the officials engaged in the strike. Such alienation between the officials and the union
members would be proof that the parties were not "functioning as a union."
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may ratify the acts of the rank and file by inaction which
manifests consent."' 3 Although liability under ratification can be
avoided by a credible demonstration of union disapproval,1 84 the
court reviewed the union officials' efforts, considered their effec-
tiveness, and found them too passive for such an avoidance.
The court relied heavily on United States Steel Corp. v.
UMWA' '8 in finding the union's actions1 6 "foreseeably ineffec-
tive."187 United States Steel is clearly distinguishable, however,
since it involved a prolonged series of unauthorized strikes.",l
"[A] series of unauthorized strikes puts the union on notice, cre-
ates or supports an inference of union ratification of strike activ-
ity, and raises the level of effort required to exculpate the union
from liability."'8' It follows that the Consolidation Coal union
officials' attempts to terminate an isolated walkout of which
they had no advance notice might be correspondingly less vigor-
ous than if they had had notice. 90 Thus, the court's conclusion
that the union officials' actions were "foreseeably ineffective"
may be inconsistent with the reasoning of United States Steel,
which implied that actions could only be considered foreseeably
ineffective when there was a prior history of ineffectiveness.
In Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit found that the
following facts demonstrated union ratification: (1) union offi-
cials failed to return to work themselves; (2) union officials failed
to publicize return-to-work directives in the media; and (3)
union officials failed to threaten disciplinary actions against
183. "A principal manifests his consent by doing nothing after learning of an unau-
thorized act, when the failure to take action is evidence of a willingness to become a
party to the action." W.A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY, § 37. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 94 (1957).
184. See Eazon Express Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 963-64 (3d
Cir. 1975).
185. 598 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1979).
186. See supra note 148.
187. 709 F.2d at 886 (citing 598 F.2d at 366).
188. In United States Steel, the mine had been the site of an average of one wildcat
strike each month during 1977, and almost one every two months during the previous
five years. 598 F.2d at 365-66.
189. 598 F.2d at 366.
190. For example, a Utah court declined to find a union liable and noted that the
factual distinction involving the series of unauthorized strikes was "pivotal in holding
the union liable" in United States Steel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1261, UMWA,
500 F. Supp. at 75.
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striking members.' 1 Not all courts consider all of these factors;
some courts have refused to consider the failure of union officials
to return to work as evidence of ratification because striking
members may threaten and intimidate union officials. 9 2 Another
court has refused to consider a failure to discipline strikers as
evidence of ratification.19 3 The imposition of sanctions, a time-
consuming process,'9 4 may be impractical during a short-term
isolated walkout. Thus, the failure of Local 1702 to publicize re-
turn-to-work orders was probably its most damaging omission.
No court has yet found ratification when a union engaged in me-
dia publication of return-to-work orders.
Other courts suggest that in each case the question involved
should be examined in light of the underlying labor agree-
ment.1 9 5 If a collective bargaining agreement contains a mere
promise to maintain the integrity of the contract, it is unlikely
that the parties to the contract agreed to assume the same po-
tential liability as would be imposed by an express no-strike
clause.119 Insofar as the Consolidation Coal opinion failed to
make reference to the terms of the agreement, the court's ap-
proach may have been too limited.
In Consolidation Coal the Fourth Circuit affirmed its belief
that Carbon Fuel should be limited to cases against an interna-
tional or district union. This affirmation confirms that "mass ac-
tion" theory is available for use against local unions. The Su-
preme Court's recent denial of certiorari 9 7 lends weight to the
191. 709 F.2d at 886.
192. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1261, UMWA, 500 F. Supp. at 75.
193. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Lorain, 616 F.2d 919, 923 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981).
194. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(5), 529 (member must be given written specific charges,
reasonable time to prepare defenses, and a full and fair hearing).
195. It has been recognized in the decisions that the facts must be examined in
the light of each situation and that there is no litmus test which can be ap-
plied. Formal Union action is not necessary. Each case stands on its particular
facts to be examined in the light of the underlying labor agreement.
12th and L. Ltd. Partnership v. Local 99-99A, Operating Engineers, 396 F. Supp. 1174,
1176 (D.D.C. 1975), quoted in United States Steel Corp. v. Local 8982 UMWA, 519 F.2d
1249, 1256 (5th Cir. 1975).
196. See United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 519 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975)(parties
intend heavier burden of proof in absence of express no-strike clause); see also Cox,
Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Part II, 61 HARv. L. REv.
274, 306-07 (1948); but see Gateway Coal Co. v. UMWA, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
197. 104 S. Ct. 487 (1983).
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Fourth Circuit's revival of "mass action" theory, but fails to
clarify the intertwined roles of agency principles and "mass ac-
tion" theory in determining local union liability. Thus, "mass ac-
tion" theory seems to remain somewhat inconsistent with the
language and legislative history of section 301 of the LMRA.
The Fourth Circuit prescribes that union officials, attempt-
ing to avoid liability under ratification for illegal work stop-
pages, should pursue vigorous methods, especially media publi-
cation of return-to-work orders, to persuade the union
membership to end their strike. The court insists upon a highly
credible demonstration of union disavowal of the strike, and will
likely find less active measures insincere and staged by the
union to avoid liability.
J. Ren6 Josey
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